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ISSUES FOR REVIEW
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*

ovements
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STATUTES
This Court is asked ro interpret the provisions of (H-J-J
38-1-5, and 38-i-lb, Ut.-ih Coee Annotated (1951 as amended),

All

three statutes have been quoted verbatim M, 'fiefs' 11I.M pp'iier.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The nature, of this case has been accurately stated as have
the facts in a p p e l a n t

3i'"i respondent briefs filed previously.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY
I
Site preparation and excavation of property done in connection
with the planned and anticipated construction of buildings constitutes the Mcommencement to do work" for purposes of 38-1-5,
Utah Code Annotated so that the lien of the general contractor
Western General Construction Company has priority over the Deed
of Trust recorded by Home Savings and Loan Association subsequent
to the date that such work began.
II
The distinction between the issue of lien enforcement and
the issue of priority precludes Home Savings from recovering
attorney's fees incurred in determining the latter,
ARGUMENT
I
The brief filed in support of Home Savings1 position

doesn't

take into consideration the fact that the language of 38-1-5 of the
Utah Code is much broader than the language of the statutes that
are interpreted by the cases cited by it in support of its
position that its Deed of Trust has priority over Western General's
lien and is in fact broader than it used to be when originally
adopted.
The predecessor of the present 38-1-5 UCA was Section 1385
of the Revised Statutes of L898 which read as follows:
"The liens herein provided shall relate back
to and take effect as of the time of the commencement
to do work upon AND (emphasis added) furnish materials
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on the ground for the structure or improvement, and
shall have priority over any lien or encumbrance subsequently intervening, except a lien herein provided for
of the same class, or which may have been created prior
thereto which was not then unrecorded and of which the
lienor under this chapter did have actual notice."
The word "AND" is emphasized because of the fact that it
has been changed under our present statute to read "OR" so that
the statute now reads that "the liens herein provided for shall
relate back to and take effect as of the time of the commencement
to do work upon OR furnish materials on the ground ..." so that
the statute now does not require the furnishing of materials
but only that Western General commenced to do work on the
ground itself.
At page 10 of its brief, Home Savings cites the Court to
the case of Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 2d 364, 294 P.2d 703
(1956), where the Court in interpreting similar language in
the bond claim statute concluded that the plowing, seeding or
manuring of land or its leveling for that purpose was insufficient
to constitute the commencement of an improvement upon land.
However, in Frehner v. Morton, 424 P.2d 446, 18 Utah 2d 422,
the Utah Supreme Court distinguished the Backus case in an
opinion written by Justice Ellet and concurred in by Justices
Callister and Tuckett with the following language:
"The reasonable interpretation of the legislative
intent gathered from the statute would seem to make it
applicable only to contracts involving buildings or
structures of some sort."
In the case before this court, the excavation work was clearly
done in connection with a building that was not only contemplate
at the time, but is now completed.

It just wasn't fully paid fo
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A prudent contractor relying on his lien rights to ensure
payment to him for his work first checks the title to the
land upon which the improvements are to be installed and
determines that there are no mortgages ahead of him.
done before he incurs expenses.

This is

Then he moves on the site with

his equipment and starts to clear and build.

If his excavation

work is visible to anyone inspecting the premises, he should be abl<
to rely on the fact that he need not go back and check the title
to the property again.

According to Western's President, the

fact that work had begun on the project would have been apparent
prior to June 7, 1984 (R-258) and Home Savings already knew the
nature of the project.
The response brief at page 13 cites the Calder Brothers
case previously decided by the Supreme Court of Utah in 1982
(Calder Brothers Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982).
In that case two trees were cut down, weeds were cleared, and
a building was painted and grouted before the mortgage was
recorded.

The Court determined that work to be merely

maintenance work that was not connected with a contract to
improve the interior of the building and is, therefore, not
in point.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons and the reasons submitted in Western General's original brief, this Court should
determine that its mechanics lien has priority over the trust
deed of Home Savings and Loan.

A failure to do so would be

to ignore the purpose of the broad language of 38-1-5 U.C.A.,
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and that is to do justice,
ff

The aim. and purpose of our mechanics lien law
manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those
who perform the labor and furnish the materials which
enter into the construction
* \l;.j "ne --*- vt-. r
improvement "
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at 2'-*A , «' 191 "M

"The most important thing to remember is that
mechanics liens are favored under Utah law. They
are intended to protect those who provide materials \
or services for the improvement of real property,
and the Court will try to find any way possible to
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successful party recovers attorney's fees.

There is a distinction

that has to be made between the issue of lien enforcement and
the issue of priority.

Western GeneralTs lien is perfectly

enforceable, it is just worthless if it is determined to be
second in priority.

Awarding attorney's fees in an action to

determine the priorities of the liens is not contemplated by
that statute.

The issue as Home Savings points out is whether

or not the mortgage lender can be included within the meaning of
the term "successful party."
38-1-17 U.C.A. provides as follows:
"Costs-Apportionment-Costs and attorneys1 fee
to subcontractor.--As between the owner and the
contractor the court shall apportion the costs
according to the right of the case, but in all
cases each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall
have his costs awarded to him, including the costs
of preparing and recording the notice of claim of
lien and such reasonable attorney's fee as may be
incurred in preparing and recording said notice of
claim of lien."
Note that the language makes reference to apportioning
costs as between the owner and the contractor.

That provision

read in connection with 38-1-5 indicates that those statutes
deal with owners and contractors and not with trust deed
holders.
"It is plain that these two sections relating
to this subject should be construed together and
that when attorney's fees are awardable thereunder
they are to be treated as costs which, as expressed
in 38-1-17 the court shall apportion the costs according to the right of the case."
Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246.
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At page 23 of its brief, Home Savings cites the court to
Brubaker v. Bennett, 19 Utah 401, 57 P. 170 (1899), as supporting
its position that a failure to award attorney's fees in this
action would constitute an unconstitutional interpretation of
the applicable statute.

The Brubaker case, however, was a

dispute between an owner and a contractor, and the court simply
said at page 402:
"If the section of our statute which allows
attorney's fees had given a fee to the winning
party, plaintiff or defendant, then the law would
not be subject to the objections raised, because
equal protection would be granted to both plaintiff
and defendant, but when the statute says that the
plaintiff shall have an attorney's fee if he wins
but does not give the same to the defendant if he
wins, there is no equality in the law."
There is no doubt that under our constitution, that
is sound logic.

It is respectfully submitted, however, that

it does not apply in the case at bar because of the fact that
the court is not asked to resolve an issue between an owner
and a contractor, it was simply asked to resolve the priority
between two lien holders.

CONCLUSION

The attorney's fee statute cited above does not contemplate
that anyone other than the owner or the contractor be awarded
their attorney's fees.

Norreferetice" is^inade -to ^atiy "other

parties who might be involved in the litigation as well.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's
determination that Home Savings and Loan Association should not
have their attorney's fees paid in a proceeding to determine
the priorities between two lien holders should be affirmed.
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Respectfully submitted this 14th day of July, 1987.

NOALL T. WOOTTON
Attorney for Appellant and
Cross-Respondent Western
General Construction Co., Inc.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing Memorandum were mailed first class, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Keith W. Meade
Attorney for Home Savings and Loan Association
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111,
this 14th day of July, 1987.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

5

IN-AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE.OF UTAH

6
7

VINCENT ROTTA, Jr.,

8
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9
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10

HAL HAWK, et.al.,

11
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IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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12
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No.
No.
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C84-6174
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C86-1310

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

STATE OF UTAH

.)

)ss
County of Utah

)

J. Sterling Wootton, being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes
and says:
1.

At all times relavent to theae proceedings I was and

am now, President of the plaintiff Western General Construction
Company.
2.

During the months of April and May of 1984, our Company

22 was engaged in the construction of a large self-storage unit locat
23

at 9100 South State Street in Salt Lake County for Pihl and Clark

24

Enterprises Inc.

25

of Don Pihl dated April 8,1986, that was filed in support of the

26

Motion of Home Savings and Loan Association for Summary Judgment

WOOTTON, SMITH
« ASSOCIATES
TTORNEYSATLAW
8 NORTH CENTER
ERICAN FORK, UTAH

756-3578

In that capacity I have examined the Affidavit

- 2 -

1

on the issue of priority of Mechanic's Liens-

2

Deed of Home Savings and Loan that was recorded June 7,1984.

3

3.

over

a. Trust

In Paragraph 5 Mr. Pihl acknowledges that there was a

4

general clearing of plant material and the moving of top soil on

5

Parcels A and B of the property prior to June 7,1984.

6

on that project during April and May,1984, in my official capacity

7

and observed that the general clearing of plant material consisted

8

of the removal of a number of trees that were over 3* feet high

9

and the removal of brush and other ground cover that exceed heighth

I was presen

10

of »

11

back hoes and traxcavators, all of which were working on parcels

12

A and B prior to June 7,1984.

13

was used to prepare the property described as Parcels 1,2 and 3

14

came from A and B, during those two months.

15

feet.

4.

The work was done by Large Tree Removal Equipment,

A large portion of the earth that

To any one observing the job site during April and May

16

of 1984, the fact that work had begun on the project would have bee

17

apparent.

18

5.

I have been informed by those working on the job everyda

19

and therefore represent to the Court, that to our knowledge no one

20

from Home Savings and Loan Association ever came out to the job sit

21

prior to June 7,1984, nor did anyone

22

our office prior to that date to determine whether or not we had

23

commenced work on those parcels of property.

24
25
26
rroM, SMITH
SSOCIATES
INEYSATLAW
RTH CENTER
AN FORK, UTAH
756-3578

from that Company ever call

s/zd&Z+r &k

J. Sterling Wootton
President, Western General
Construction Company

MECHANICS1 LIENS
applicable. Boberts v. Hansen, 25 U. (2d)
190, 479 P. 2d 345.

38-1-3

Collateral References.
Mechanics' Liens<@=>86.
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens §§ 90, 97.
53 Am. Jar. 2d 512, Mechanics' Liens
§i-

Time for filing lien.
Materialman who supplies homeowner
is original contractor within meaning of
statute and has eighty rather than sixtydays within which to file mechanic's lien
against homeowner's transferee. Smith
Brothers Lbr. Co. v. Johnson, 19 U. (2d)
107, 426 P. 2d 811.

Who is a "contractor" within provisions
of lien law which limit liens for material
or labor furnished to contractor to amount
earned but unpaid on contract, or give
such liens by subrogation, S3 A L. B. 1152.

38-1-3. Those entitled to Ken—What may be attached—Lien on ores
mined.—Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any services or furnishing any materials used in the construction, alteration, or
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials
for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any minin*
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed architects
and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps,
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or
who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor,
shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials, for the value of
the service rendered, labor performed or materials furnished by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person
acting by his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property, but the
interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, whether working
under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chapter include
products mined and excavated while the same remain upon the premises
included within the lease.
History: E. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907,
§§ 1372, 1381, 1382, 1397; L. 1911, ch. 27,
§12; O. L. 1917, §§286, 3722, 3731, 3732,
3747; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-3; L. 1973,
ch. 73, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1973 amendment substituted "any
services or * * * in any manner" near the
beginning of the first sentence for "labor
upon, or furnishing materiaJs to be used
in, the construction or alteration of, or
addition to, or repair of, any building,
structure or improvement upon land; all
foundry men and boilermakers; all persons
performing labor or furnishing materials
for the construction, repairing or carrying
on of any mill, manufactory or hoisting
works."
Cross-Reference.
Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen under private contracts, 14-2-1.
Construction and application.
The purpose of the lien statutes is to

protect those who have added directly to
the value of property by performing labor
or furnishing materials upon it. Stanton
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 U. (2d) 184,
341 P. 2d .207, explained in 23 U. (2d)
395, 464 P. 2d 387.
This statute contemplates that the material to be lienable must be consumed in its
use on the property. Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 U. (2d) 184, 341 P.
2d 207, explained in 23 U. (2d) 395, 464
P. 2d 387.
Where several lien claimants are unable
to segregate and fix the value of materials
which went into various properties, it is
proper to apply an equitable apportionment rule which would charge each lot
with an equal share of the totals claimed
by the several materialmen; and in applying this rule it should be made to appear
that there is no available means of definite
proof as to just what material went into
which unit of property, that there is sufficient proof that some material actually
went into structures, and that the land is
sufficiently identified and described in the

473

38-1-4

LIENS

38-1-4. Amount of land affected—Lots and subdivisions—Mines—Fitan.
chises, fixtures and appurtenances.—The liens granted by this chapter shall
extend to and cover so much of the land whereon such building, structure
or improvement shall be made as may be necessary for the convenient
use and occupation thereof, and in case any such building shall occupy
two or more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots or subdivisions
shall be deemed one for the purposes of this chapter; and when twd or
more mining claims, mines or valuable deposits, whether owned by the
same person or not, shall, with the consent of all, be worked through a
common shaft, tunnel, incline, drift or other excavation, then all the mining
claims, mines or valuable deposits so worked shall for the purposes of 'this
chapter be deemed one; and the liens in this chapter provided for sjhall
attach to all franchises, privileges, appurtenances, and to all machinery jand
fixtures, pertaining to or used in connection with any such lands, buildings,
structures or improvements, mining claims, mines or valuable deposits.
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907,
§§1377, 1379, 1381; C. L. 1917, §§3727,
3729, 3731; B. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-4.
Lumber.

Although lumber delivered went into
different structures, it was delivered under
single contract and each of structures constituted part of single plant; therefore,
lien exists on entire premises for lumber
used in each structure. Salt Lake Lithographing Co. v. Ibex Mine & Smelting Co.,
15 U. 440, 49 P. 768, 62 Am. St. Eep. 944.
Questions of law and fact.
The question of how much land is necessary is question of fact. Park City Meat
Co. v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 U.
145, 103 P. 254.
Eemoved building.
Removal of building by third persons
to land other than that on which it was
originally erected without knowledge and
consent of owner thereof, or- mechanic's
lien holders, does not relieve building in
its new location from liability of a deficiency existing on the sale of the land on
which the building was erected to satisfy
such liens. Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 U. 379,
85 P. 363, 85 P. 1012.
Scope and extent of lien generally.
Necessary appurtenances, including ease-

ments which extend outside of boundaries
of land upon which building is erected,
is covered by provisions of this section.
Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock gfilver
Mining Co., 36 U. 145, 103 P. 254.
Waiver, loss or forfeiture of lien,
Where there is substantial compliance
with statute creating lien, and Hen has in
fact been established, lien so established
cannot be defeated by technicalities nor
by nice distinctions. Park City Meajt Co.
v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 UL 145,
103 P. 254.
Collateral Eeferences.
Mechanics' LiensC=>22.
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 20.
53 Am. Jur. 2d 553, Mechanics' Liens
§39.
Construction, application, and effect of
provision of lien statute as to quantity or
area of land around improvement which
may be subjected to the lien, 84 A.|L. E.
123.
Mechanic's lien for work on or material
for separate buildings of one ownjer, 15
A. L. R. 3d 73.
Single mechanic's lien upon several parcels, as enforceable against less than all
of the parcels (including effect of release
of some of them from the lien), 130 A.
L. B. 423.

38-1-5. Priority—Over other encumbrances.—The liens herein provided
for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of the comipencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure pr improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or othpr encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time wh^n the
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first
478

MECHANICS' LIENS

38-1-5

material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other
encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground.
of the work or furnishing the materials.
Canal is not in existence until constructed.
Garland v. Bear Lake & River Waterworks
& Irr. Co., 9 U. 350, 34 P. 368, affd. 164
U. S. 1, 41 L. Ed. 327, 17 S. Ct. 7.
Lien for all of materials furnished by
single lien claimant on continuous, open,
running account, for purpose of developing and operating mine, held prior to
trust deed executed by mining company
and recorded between times when materials are first and last furnished. Fields
v. Daisy Gold Mining Co., 25 U. 76, 69
P. 528; Salt Lake-Hardware Co. v. Fields,
69 P. 1134, not officially reported.

History: E. S. 1898 & C. I*. 1907,
$$1084, 1385; C. L. 1917, §§3734, 3735;
R. S. 1933 & G. 1943, 52-1-5.
Commencement and duration of lien.
Tins section expressly provides that liens
ahall attach at the time the performance
of the contract commences; accordingly,
claimant's lien attaches on the date he
commences the work or furnishes the material, and is not postponed to the date of
filing the notice for record. Morrison v.
Carey-Lombard Co., 9 U. 70, 33 P. 238, explained in 10 U. 274, 37 P. 495.
Mechanic's lien takes effect as of date
of commencement of work and furnishing
of materials, and is prior to intervening
equities. Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 U. 379, 85
P. 363, 85 P. 1012.
When labor and materials are furnished
to one not an owner, lien attaches to
title instant title vests in owner so contracting for labor and materials furnished
before he became the owner. United States
Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Midvale Home Finance Corp., 86 XJ. 506, 44 P. 2d 1090, reh.
den. S6 U. 522, 46 P. 2d 672.

Where vendees of land contracts on
property involved jointly assigned errors
in mortgage foreclosure action on crossappeal, their liens are postponed to date
of last vendee's contract, and claims of
lien claimants attach as of date when first
materials are furnished and first labor performed; and claim of lien claimants is
held superior to claim of such vendees in
foreclosure action. United States Bldg. &
Loan Assn. v. Midvale Home Finance
Corp., 86 U. 506, 44 P. 2d 1090, reh. den.
86 U. 522, 46 P. 2d 672.

Estoppel.
A person furnishing materials may be
estopped by his or its acts and conduct
from enjoying the priority accorded by
this section. Spargo v. Nelson, 10 TJ. 274,
37 P. 495.

Lien for labor and materials supplied
purchaser of lot for building constructed
thereon is inferior to interest of vendor
of the lot and his successor, where it is
not shown that vendor or his successor
consent to, ratify, or authorize the furnishing of the materials and labor. Burton
Walker Lbr. Co. v. Howard, 92 U. 02, 66
P. 2d 134.

Extent of Uen,
While mortgagee who advances money
to mortgagor to construct a building has
lien prior to that of a subcontractor performing labor and furnishing materials
for such building, such Uen extends only
to amount actually advanced on mortgage.
Culmer Paint & Glass Co. v. Gleason, 42
U. 344, 130 P. 66.
Notice to lien holders.
This section requires other lien holders,
by mortgage or otherwise, to take notice
of the commencement of work on the
building. Teahen v. Nelson, 6 U. 363, 23 P.
764.
Priority over other Hens and claims.
A deed of trust upon a canal to be constructed cannot take precedence over a
mechanic's lien for work done and materials furnished in building the canal, although trust deed antedates the doing

In determining priorities between construction mortgagee and mechanic's lienors, mortgage for definite amount recorded
prior to attachment of any Uen takes
priority up to the amount actually paid
over any mechanic's Hens attaching subsequent to recording of mortgage, although
loan which mortgage is intended to secure
is paid over to borrower as needed and
never advanced in full. Western Mtg. Loan
Corp. v. Cottonwood Coustr. Co., 18 U.
(2d) 409, 424 P. 2d 437.
Purchase money mortgage.
A mechanic's lien is superior even to a
purchase money mortgage given at time of
purchase of property in question where
mortgagee, after materials are furnished,
releases original mortgage and takes new
mortgage, which transaction, however, is
not in renewal of old mortgage, but is
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38-1-17

LIENS

38-1-17. Costs—Apportionment—Costs and attorneys* * fee to subcontractor.—As between the owner and the contractor the court shall apportion the costs according to the right of the case, but in all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his costs awarded to him, including
the costs of preparing and recording the notice of claim of lien and ^ueh
reasonable attorney's fee as may be incurred in preparing and recording
said notice of claim of lien.
History: E. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, §1394;
C. L. 1917, § 3744; E. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
52-1-17; L. 1961, ch. 76, § 1 .

and to recover for services rendered under contract of employment, it is not Terror
to allow interest on sum awarded, &andberg v. Victor Gold & Silver Minin J Co
24 U. 1, 66 P. 360.
* ''

Compiler's Notes.
The 1961 amendment added provision for
reasonable attorney's fees for preparation
and recording of notice of claim of lien.

Collateral Eeferences.
Mechanics' Liens€=»310(l).
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 350.
53 Am. Jur. 2d 942, Mechanics' f Liens
§ 432.
'

Interest on judgment.
In action to foreclose mechanic's lien

38-1-18. Attorneys fees.—In any action brought to enforce an^ lien
under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recqfer a
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.
History: E. S. 1898, § 1400; L. 1899, ch.
58, § 1 ; C. L. 1907, §1400; C. L. 1917,
§ 3750; E. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-18; L.
1961, en. 76, § 2.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1961 amendment deleted a provision
fixing the minimum amount of attorneys'
fees of not to exceed $25.
Cross-Eeference.
Attorneys' fee in suit for wages, 3427-1.
Denial on excessive claim.
THiere it appears on trial that contractor has substantially performed his contract but that he attempts to overcharge
the owner in setting the total amount due
on a cost-plus-ten-per-cent contract, the
court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to award the contractor attorney
fees in suit to collect upon such contract.
Shupe v. Menlove, 18 V. (2d) 130, 417 P. 2d
246.
Eeduction by trial court.
Lower court can properly reduce award
of attorney's fees to party successful in
foreclosing mechanic's lien by one-half of
jury's award since under statute award of
jury is advisorv onlv. Frehner v. Morton,
18 TJ. (2d) 422,* 424 P. 2d 446.
Successful party.
Award of attorney's fees is available to

person defending against lien sidce this
section confers that benefit not pnly on
one who asserts lien but upon "the successful party." Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22
U. (2d) 297, 452 P. 2d 325.
Validity of lien.
Where claims of materialman for mechanics' liens are valid, he is entitled to
a reasonable attorney's fee under'this section where penalty provided by 38-1-24 for
alleged failure of materialman to release
liens is sought by builder who contends
that the liens are invalid. Brimwood
Homes, Inc. v. Knudsen Buildefs Supply
Co., 14 U. (2d) 419, 385 P. 2d 9^2.
Materialman is not entitled to attorney's
fee in proceedings to foreclose riiechanic's
lien where the original notice o^ lien was
deficient and attempted amendment to correct deficiencies was not filed lintil after
the time for filing had expired. Eoberts
Investment Co. v. Gibbons & peed Concrete Products Co., 22 U. (2d) 105, 449 P.
2d 116.
Collateral Eeferences.
Mechanics' LiensC=»310(l).
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens §^53.
53 Am. Jur. 2d 943, Mechanics' Liens
§ 433.
Amount of compensation of attorney for
services as to mechanic's lien in absence
of contract or statute fixing J amount, 56
A. L. E. 2d 114.
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owner as in this chapter provided, shall be deemed an original contractor, and all
other persons doing work or furnishing materials shall be deemed subcontractor*
[C. L. § 3815*: '90. p. 25*: *94, p. 47.

1384. Priority over other incumbrances. The liens provided f0f

yXX

herein are preferred to any lien, mortgage. i>r other incumbrance which n^
have attached subsequent to the time when thp building, improvement, or struo,
ture was commenced, work done, or materials were .'nmmeneed to be furnish^
also to any lien, mortgage, or other incumbrance of which the lienholder had no
notice and which was unrecorded at the time the building, improvement, 0r
structure was commenced, work done, or materials commenced to be furnisher}
[C. L. § 3810: '90. p. '29*: '9-L p. 47.
1 3 8 5 . Id. Relates back. The liens herein provided shall relate ba^
to and take effect as of the time of the commencement to do work upon and fUr.
nish materials on the ground for the structure or improvement, and -hall have
priority over any lien or incumbrance subsequently intervening, except a Ij^
herein* provided* for of the same ela>s. or which may have been created pn<)r
thereto, which was not then recorded and of which the lienor under this chapter
did have actual notice. ['90, p. 29*: *94. p. 47.
A deed of trust which covers all the property the
such lien shall relate back to commencement „towner then had. or might thereafter acquire, canwork or furnishing of materials, the subcontractor«
not take precedence of a mechanic's lien for work
lien attaches on the date of furnishing the first
done and material furnished in building the canal.
material, and payments thereafter made by th*
Garland v. Bear River Irr. Company, 9 U. 3o0: 34 owner to the contractor, though before the lien u
P. 368. Affirmed 164 U. S. 1. Under laws of 1S90 filed, are made at his own peril. I arey-Lombarri
giving a lien to subcontractors, and providing that
Co. v. Partridge, 10 U. 322: 37 P. 572.

1 3 8 6 . Recording lien. Every original contractor, within sixty dav*
after the completion of his contract, and every person save the original contractor
claiming the benefit of this chapter, must, within forty days after furnishing the
last material or performing the last labor for any building, improvement, or
structure, or for any alteration, addition to. 0r repair thereof, or performance of
any labor in or furnishing any materials for any mining claim, file for record
with the county recorder of the county in whi<>h the property or some part thereof
is situated, a claim in writing containing &, notice of intention to hold and
claim a lien, and a statement of his demand, after deducting all just credits and
offsets, with the name of the owner, if knowii and also the name of the person
by whom he was employed, or to whom he fuftiished the material, with a statement of the terms, time given, and conditions of his contract, specifying the rime
when the first and last labor was performed, pr the first and last materials furnished, and also a description of the property tp be charged with the lien, sufficient
for identification, which claim must be verified bv the oath of himself or of some
other person. [C. L. §3811*: '90, pp. 26-7*; '94, pp. 47-S.
Under act of 1S69 the notice of lien must state
the amount of money due. but need not state the
time when due or to become due. Doane v. Clinton, 2 U. 417. Under same act it was held that not

only the contractor but laborers and materialmen
had three months after the completion of the building in which to file a notice of lien. Eclipse Mfg.
Co. v. Nichols, 1 U. 252.

1 3 8 7 . Joining liens on separate properties. Liens against two or
more buildings, mining claims, or other improvements owned by the same person
or persons may be included in one claim; but in such case the person filing the
claim must designate therein the amount claimed to be due to him on each
of such buildings, mining claims, or other improvements. [C. L. § 3812*; '94,
p. 48.
1 3 8 8 . F i l i n g claim before doing work. Any subcontractor before
commencing to furnish materials or to perform work, or at any time thereafter
and before the completion of his contract, may file a statement of claim with the
recorder as hereinbefore provided, containing a notice of intention to hold and
claim a lien, a description of the property to be charged, and the probable value of
the work to be done, or the probable value of tfie materials to be furnished, as near
as mav be. From the time such statement srjall have been filed, he shall have a
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statement of petitioner in open court without any evidence being taken * * *." I
think we are obligGd to review the representations made to the court in the light
most favorable to the petitioner.
It is not for us to conjecture how the
witness or witnesses would have impressed
the court had the matter been tried and
had they testified. It is the uniformly accepted rule that, where a motion is made
for summary dismissal before evidence is
presented, the court surveys the matter as
it then stands in the light most favorable
to the party against whom the motion is
made. 2 This is also true even after evidence has been presented, if the motion
is made before the party has rested his
case. 3 If the motion is granted the appellate court similarly reviews the record. 4

294 P.2d 703
Royal Audrey BACKUS, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
Gus S. HOOTEN and Ella H. Hooten,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 8375.

Supreme Court of Utah.
March 1, 1956.

Action against landowner to recover
for rental of machinery and equipment used
by contractor in leveling land. The District
Court, Beaver County, Will L. Hoyt, J., entered judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme
Court, Worthen, J., held that the statute requiring an owner of land to obtain a bond
from the contractor before work for improvement upon land is commenced, did not
require owner to obtain bond from contractor who contracted to level land, and
From whatever perspective we review the
failure of landowner to procure bond did
matter, I think the trial court was correct
not render him liable for the rental of the
in dismissing the petition because there apmachinery used by the contractor.
pears no basis in the petition, or in the
Judgment affirmed.
statement of Mr. Arnovitz from which
reasonable minds could fincl that Mrs. Val- !. Appeal and Error C=9I9
entine was incompetent.
Where trial court dismissed complaint
for failure to state claim upon which relief
WADE, J., concurs in the opinion of could be granted, on appeal, complaint was
CROCKETT, J.
required to be examined in light most faford, Colo., 274 P.2d 93; Wood v. Chi2. Holland v. Columbia Iron Min. Co., 4
Utah 2d — , 293 P.2d 700. See Morris
cago. M. & St. Paul R.R. Co., 45 Wash.
v. Farnsworth Motel, Utah. 250 P.2d
2d 601r 277 P.2d 345.
297, 29S; Strauss v. Strauss, DO CaLApp.
2d 757, 203 P.2d S57, S58.
4. Martin v. Stevens, Utah, 243 P.2d 747;
Moedy v. Moedy. Colo.. 276 P.2d 563;
3. Arnold v. Sanstol, 43 Wash.2d 294, 260
Leming v. Oil Fields Trucking Co., 44
P.2d 327; Metzger v. Quick, 46 Wash.2d
Cal.2d 343, 2S2 P.2d 23; 88 C.J.S., Trial,
477, 232 P.2d 812; Eberle v. Himger§242.

BACKUS

. HOOTEN
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vorable to plaintiff's contention with every
reasonable intendment in favor of allegations of complaint.
2. Mechanics' Liens C=3I3
Under statute providing that owner ofj
interest in land before entering into con-(
tract, involving $500 or more, for "improvement upon land*' shall obtain bond
from contractor for payment of materials
furnished, owner of land who contracted to
have land leveled was not required to obtain
bond, and failure to procure bond did not
render him liable to owner of machinery
for rental of machinery used by contractor.
U.C.A.1953, 14-2-1, 14-2-2.
See publication Words and Phrases,
for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Improvement Upon Land".
3. Mechanics' Liens 0=313
The expression "or improvement upon
land", as used in statute requiring owner of
land contracting for construction, addition
to, or alteration or repair of any building,
structure or improvement upon land, to obtain from contractor bond conditioned on
payment of materials and labor used (referred only to improvements of a character
similar to those specifically mentioned.
U.C.A.1953, 14-2-1.
Cline, Wilson & Cline, Milford, for appellant.
Durham Morris, Cedar City, for respondents.
WORTHEN, Justice.
Appeal from a judgment dismissing
plaintiffs complaint on the ground that it
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failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
The complaint alleges that defendants
own land in Beaver County, Utah; that
they entered into a contract with one Jerry
Busby by the terms of which contract Busby agreed to level a number of acres of
land on their property; that plaintiff extended credit to the said Jerry Busby and
delivered to him certain machinery and
equipment which were used by Busby in
leveling said lands; that Busby agreed to
pay plaintirT for the rental of said machinery and equipment but failed and neglected to fully pay for same, notwithstanding defendants paid Busby sufficient to have
paid plaintiff. Defendants failed to obtain
a private contractor's bond from Busby.
PlaintirT contends that the contract between defendants and Busby is one for
which a private contractor's bond is required, and having failed to require such
bond the defendants are liable to plaintiff
for the rental value of the leveling machinery and equipment used by Busby in
leveling defendants' land.
Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U.C.A.1953,
provide:
"14-2-1. The owner of any interest
in land entering into a contract, involving $500 or more, for the construction,
addition to, or alteration or repair of,
any building, structure or improvement
upon land shall, before any such work
is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the
contract price, with good and sufficient
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sureties, conditioned for the faithful
performance of the contract and
prompt payment for material furnished
and labor performed under the contract. Such bond shall run to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear; and any person
who has furnished materials or performed labor for or upon any such
building, structure or improvement,
payment for which has not been made,
shall have a direct right of action
against the sureties upon such bond for
the reasonable value of the materials
furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the
prices agreed upon; * * *
"14-2-2. Any person subject to the
provisions of this chapter, who shall
fail to obtain such good and sufficient
bond, * * * shall be personally liable to all persons who have furnished
materials or performed labor under the
contract for the reasonable value of
such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any
case the prices agreed upon/'
[1] The trial court having dismissed
plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, we
must examine the complaint in the light
most favorable to plaintiff's contention and
with every reasonable intendment in favor
of the allegations of said complaint.

construction, addition to, or alteration or
repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon land" so as to compel the
landowners to require a bond from the contractor? (2) If our first question is answered in the affirmative, does rental equipment furnish to the contractor which enables him to perform the work with less labor come under the term, "material furnished and labor performed under the contract"?
[2,3] We are of the opinion that the
work done upon defendants' land in leveling
the same is not an improvement upon land
requiring defendants to comply with the
requirement of the statute.
The reasonable interpretation of the legislative intent, gathered from the statute,
would seem to make it applicable only to
contracts involving buildings or structures
of some sort.
It would seem to constitute a strain on
the language of the statute to interpret it so
as to hold that the contract before us was
one for the construction of an improvement upon land. To reach such a conclusion would require that we put a strained
construction on the statute and treat it as
saying "For the construction, addition to, or
alteration or repair of any building, structure or improvement upon land or for any
improvement of land."

The question here presented has not before
been passed on by this court, nor has
Is a contract for leveling land presumably
so that it would be more susceptible to ir- any case been called to our attention, nor
rigation and cultivation a contract "for the have we found one passing on the same.
The ruling presents two questions: (1)

BACKUS ^ HOOTEN
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The cases cited by both counsel involve
mechanic's liens and each decision is rendered with respect to the statute oi the particular state. Our attention has been called
to an early Iowa case l which case has not
been overruled. The Iowa code secured a
lien to "every mechanic, or other person
who shall do any labor upon, or furnish
any materials, machinery, or fixtures, for
any building, erection, or other improvement upon land." Code 1873, § 2130. The
lower court declared a lien on the land in
favor of one who broke up prairie land by
plowing. The Supreme Court reversed the
case and used this language:
"Now, while breaking and turning
over of the soil may constitute an im- ,
provement of the land, it cannot in any
just sense be denominated an improvement upon the land. The breaking of
the prairie is necessary to the growth
of crops, but not more necessary than
the annual plowing which precedes the
planting of crops. If a lien should be
allowed for the first breaking of the
prairie, we are unable to see upon what
principle it would be denied for the
subsequent plowings, which are indispensable to the proper cultivation of
the soil.- Fertilizers greatly improve
land. It would probably not be claimed
that a lien would be acquired for hauling manure upon land. It is not proper
for us now to undertake to determine
to what classes of improvements section 2130 applies. The only question;
which is before us is, does it apply to
I. Brown v. Wyman, 1S81, 56 Iowa 452, 9
N.W. 344, 345, 41 Am.Rep. 117.

the plowing of the soil? We think that
to givt it such an application would
extend it beyond what was contemplated by the legislature, and beyond
what its language, fairly construed,
justines."
Let it be conceded that leveling land enhances its value and improves its utility.
It does not follow that such leveling constitutes an improvement upon land. It
would seem to be an unreasonable construction to hold that a contract for plowing, seeding, or manuring of land is a contract for the construction of an improvement upon land.
Xor do we feel that it is necessary to call
upon any rules of statutory interpretation
since the language seems not to require interpretation. However, under a familiar
rule oi construction the expression "or improvement upon land" can only refer to improvements of a character similar to those
immediately before mentioned. 2
We are of the opinion that Section 14-2-1
did not require defendants to obtain a bond
before entering into the contract with Busby to level their land.
Because of our holding that the work
which defendants engaged Busby to do does
not come within the class for which a bond
was required it is unnecessary for us to
pass upon the second question raised.
Judgment affirmed.

Costs to defendants.

McDOXOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT,
HEXRIOD and WADE, JJ., concur.
2. Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd
Ed., Vol. 2, p. 393. Sec. 4909.
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Affirmed, each party to bear its costs.

REPORTS
scape architect and contractor were entitled to lien for landscaping work.

CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER
and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

Affirmed.
Nelson, District Judge, dissented.

H E N R I O D , J., concurs in the result.

1. Mechanics' Liens C=l
Purpose of mechanics' lien statute is

ELLETT, J., being disqualified did not
participate therein.

to protect those who have directly added
to value of real property by performing
labor or furnishing material upon it. U.C.
A.1953, 38-1-3.

O
^

! KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
-*

I

w-i r n •••-

-i»»

2. Mechanics1 Liens C=l

<V

Mechanics' lien statute is intended to
prevent owner of land from taking benefits
424 P.2d 446

of improvements placed on his property

Leon FREHNER and Minnie C. Frehner dba
Mountain West Gardens, and Leon C. Frehner, Plaintiffs and Respondents,

without paying for labor and material that

any other person acting by his authority
as agent, contractor or otherwise.

Feb. 24, 1967.
recover

furnished plats, plans, maps, superintendfessional services at instance of owner or

Supreme Court of Utah.

to

Architects are protected by mechanics'
lien statute and have lien when they have
ence, etc., or have rendered other like pro-

No. 10525.

Action

U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-3.

3. Mechanics' Liens e»36

v.
Margaret MORTON, D. A. Skeen and Bertha
K. Skeen, and Prudential Federal Savings
& Loan Association, a corporation, Defendants and Appellants.

services.

went into them.

for

landscaping

The Third District Court, Salt

4. Mechanics' Liens 0281(3)
Evidence in action to enforce lien for

Lake County, Joseph G. Jeppson, J., render-

services rendered in landscaping newly con-

ed judgment from which defendants ap-

structed house would support finding that

pealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed.

The

plaintiffs' work had been authorized by de-

Supreme Court, Ellett, J., held that land-

fendants, who were building house for their

son engaged in several distinct occupations or businesses in the same licensing

territory may be required to pay a license
tax for each."

FUEHRER 7. MORTON
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daughter, in that defendants had authorized
their daughter to engage plaintiff.

U.C

Allei i II. Swan, Salt Lake City, for
respondents

A. 1953, 38-1-3.
ELLETT, Justice:

5.. Trial 0=374(2)
Trial judge had sole prerogative to

Plaintiffs

sued to collect for

services

determine disputed questions of fact in

rendered in landscaping around a newly

equity matters.

constructed

City, Utah. From a jury verdict and judg-

Mechanics' lien foreclosure proceeding
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-18.

ment thereon in favor of the plaintiffs, the
defendants appeal.

7. Equity 0=1
District court has jurisdiction of both
law and equity matters, but proceedings in
equitable matters are not same as in law
matters..

defendants

Skeen in Summit Park, east of Salt Lake

6. Mechanics' Liens C=245<2)
is equitable.

house owned by

Rules of Civil Procedure, rules

1, 72(a); U.C.A.1953, 59-12-20.

The points urged are (1) that the court
erred in ruling that the landscaping work
comes within the laborers' and. materialmen's
lien statute;

and (2) that the evidence

shows that the defendants did not authorize
the work done.

8. M ec h a n i cs' Lien s C=» 310(3)

In the fall of 1964' the defendants Skeen

Plaintiffs in mechanics' lien foreclosure
proceeding were not entitled to attorney
fee in amount awarded by jury, rather than
lesser amount awarded by court, in view
of equitable nature of proceedings and statute providing that court should fix fee.
U.C.A.1953, 38-1-1S.

obtained a loan from the defendant Prudential Federal Savings &' Loan Association to finance the building of a house on
a lot they owned in Summit Park, so that
their married daughter, Margaret Skeen
Morton, and her children would have a
place to live.

It is shown that Margaret

was given permission to direct the con-

9. Mechanics'' Liens C=33(I)
Landscape architect and contractor
were entitled to lien for landscaping work.
U.C.A.1953, 38-1-3.

struction according to her wishes and that
she proceeded to oversee and make changes
in the job as she desired. With Mr. Skeen's
knowledge she engaged the plaintiffs to
do the landscaping on the grounds, which

Benjamin Spence, Sal: L
appellants.

for

included installation of a concrete waterfall
and pool.

18 UTAH 2d REPORTS
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The statute under which plaintiffs claim

connection with the house being built by a

authorizes a lien for labor and material

general contractor. The defendants refused

used in the

to pay on the grounds that they had not

"*

*

*

construction or

alteration of, or addition to, or repair of,

authorized the work.

any building, structure or improvement upon

record that the defendant D. A. Skeen

land."

wanted his daughter, Margaret, and her

(Section 38-1-3, U.C.A.1953.)

It is plain from the

children to have a. home, that all should
[1,2]

The purpose of this statute as

be in accordance with her desires, and that

applied to this case is 10 protect those who

in conformity with this purpose she was

have added directly to the value of real

given a comparatively free hand as to its

property by performing labor or furnishing

construction.

material upon it.

had had previous unsatisfactory dealings

(Stanton Transportation

Company v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 R2d
207.)

The statute is intended and designed

to prevent the owner of land from taking
the benefits of improvements placed on his

Mr. Skeen indicated that he

with the plaintiff, Mr. Frehner.

Notwith-

standing this, he permitted Margaret to
go ahead and obtain the plaintiffs services
if she so desired.

He also testified:

property without paying for the labor and
material that went into them. (King Broth-

Q.

* * *,

when she told you she

ers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13

wanted to landscape the land, did you

Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254.)

have any other conversation with her
about going ahead with it?

[3]

Architects are also protected and

have a lien when they have

furnished

plats, plans, maps, superintendence and so
forth, or when they have rendered other
like professional services at the instance of

A.

Yes.

I said, "If that is your de-

cision, Margaret, I want to have you
happy, you make your decision—you be
independent on it. I realize we will have

the owner or any other person acting by

to provide money to pay for the building,

his authority as agent, contractor or other-

and if the landscaping is not included

wise.

in that, I will have-to get the money on

(See Headlund v. Daniels, 50 Utah

the side."

381, 167 P. 1170.)
Leon Frehner, one of the plaintiffs, was

[4]

It is further shown that there was

a professional landscape architect, and his

talk between the general contractor and

wife, the other plaintiff, was a landscape

Mr. Skeen about the plaintiff

contractor holding a license from the State

doing the work and that Mr. Skeen made

of Utah as a specialty contractor.

no objection but allowed Frehner to con-

They

designed and completed the landscaping in

tinue.

Frehner

These facts provide a reasonable

Cite as ISL* :aii 2d 422

basis for the conclusions that the daughter,

The plaintiffs cross-appealed and abked

Margaret, was authorized by the defendants

that the $750 attorney's fee be reinstated

to engage the plaintiff to do the landscap-

by thils court,

ing; that it was done with the defendant
knowledge: and that, therefore, under the
statute their interest in the property was
liable for the improvement thus conferred

^

.. v ;uld seem that the jury could

only have been advisory to the trial judge,
as it is his sole prerogative to determine
disputed questions of fact in equity matters.

upon it,

A't the time of enacting Section 38—1-18
The trial judge impaneled a jury to try

above, the legislature undoubtedly worded

various issues but finally directed them as

the statute as they did because they believed

to liability and decided as a matter of law

the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien to be

that plaintiffs held a valid and subsisting

an equitable proceeding.

lien on the realty. The amount due and the
amount thereof subject to the lien were left
for determination by the jury, as was the
amount of attorney's fees to be allowed for

The following language is taken from 36
Am.Jr., Mechanics' Liens, § 239, at page
152:1
Where the distinction between actions

foreclosing the lien.

at law and suits in equity is maintained,
The statute providing for attorney's fees
is as follows;

proceedings to enforce mechanics1 liens
are regarded as suits in equity, although

In any action brought to enforce any
lien under this chapter the

successful

the complainant retains the title of the
materials .furnished until paid for, and

party shall be entitled to recover a reason-

are governed by the rules of chancery

able attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the

, practice except so far as the mechanic's

court, which shall be taxed as costs in
the action.

lien laws have otherwise provided.

(Section 38-1-1S, U.C.A.

1953.)

"^
vii'e.

The jury awarded a fee of $750, *-u: * r
hearing defendants' motion for a new trie,

. .;e statute does nui uuie. \ ^ . .- -.>Dwyer v. Salt Lake City Copper

Mfg. Co.. 14 ;."::,» .v^, " i

71'.. hold: a

lie:: foreclosure to \.e equital ,e.

and to set aside the verdict and judgment
thereon, the court required the plaintiffs

[7]

In Utah the District Court has

to submit to a reduction of attorney's fee

jurisdiction of both equity and law matters,.

to one-half of the total amount covered by

yet the proceedings in equitable matters

the lien.

arc not the same as in law matters.

(See
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Rules 1 and 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Section 59-12-20, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended; see also Zeile
v. Moritz, 1 Utah 283.)

addition to, or alteration or repair of, any
building, structure or improvement upon
land * * *."
In the Backus case it was said:

We, therefore, dismiss the plain-

We are of the opinion that the work

tiffs' cross-appeal as being without merit,

done upon defendants' land in leveling

even assuming that they are entitled to a

the same is not an improvement upon

lien.

land requiring defendants to comply with

[8]

If they are not entitled to a lien,

they would not be entitled to an attorney's

the requirement of the statute.

fee even though one or more of the de-

The reasonable interpretation of the

fendants might be liable for the value of

legislative intent, gathered from the stat-

the work done

ute, would seem to make it applicable only
to contracts involving buildings or struc-

This leaves us with

the problem of

whether or not landscaping under the Utah

tures of some sort.
*
*
*
*

*

*

law is work that may be protected by a mechanics lien. The lien statute covers ma-

Let it be conceded that leveling land en-

terial furnished and work done in the con-

hances its value and improves its utility.

struction, alteration, or addition to or repair

It does not follow that such leveling con-

of any building, structure,

stitutes an improvement upon land.

or

improvement

It

upon land. It will be noted that the statute

would seem to be an unreasonable con-

does not give the lien solely for improve-

struction to hold that a contract for plow-

ments to the land. This was decided in the

ing, seeding, or manuring of land is a

case of Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 2d 364,

contract for1 the construction of an im-

294 P:2d 703.

provement upon land.

That was a case where a

contractor had leveled land so it could be
cultivated and irrigated.

The matter was

Nor do we feel that it is necessary to
call upon any rules of statutory* interpre-

before the Supreme Court under Section

tation since the language seems not to re-

14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which

quire interpretation.

However, under a

makes a land owner personally liable for

familiar rule of construction the expres-

work done and material furnished when he

sion "or improvement upon land" can

does not require a bond from the contractor,

only refer to improvements of a character

etc.

similar to those immediately before men-

The language of the bond section is

practically identical with that of the lien

tioned.

section: " *

tion, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, p. 393, Sec. 4909.)

*

*

for the construction,

(Sutherland Statutory Construc-

FKEHFER v. MORTON
Cite as IS

This is known in law as the Rule of Ejus-

427

Utah 2d 422

CALLISTER

and

TUCKETT,

J] .,

dem Generis, sometimes called Lord Tenterden's Rule, the doctrine being that where an
enumeration of specific things is followed
by some more general word or phrase, such

HEXRIOD, Justice (concurring in the result)

general word or phrase is to be held to refer

I concur in the result but not ii i some

to things of the same kind with respect to a

portions of the main opinion that seem to

classification which immediately precedes

be obiter that might be construed erroneous-

it.

ly in its application to possible future cases.

(28 C.J.5. p. 1049. See also Gaustad v.

Xygaani 64 N.D. 785, 256 N.W. 230.)

It is said therein that *'It will be noted

Now, if leveling land is not within the

that the statute does not give the lien for

statute, why should landscaping in this case

improvements to the land.*' True. But the

be so? The distinction is that the leveling

statute says upon the land.

of land in the Backus case was not done in

Hooten says nothing to the contrary, but did

Backus v.

connection with any building, structure, or

use some gratuitous and unnecessary lan-

improvement upon the land, while in the in-

guage with respect to plowing, fertilizer and

stant case the landscaping was done as an

seeds, all of which had little or nothing to

integral part of the building of a home.

do with leveling of the land,—the only ques-

The landscaping was designed to give the

tion in that case.

same esthetic qualities to the home as would
the paint applied to the building after it was
finished.

Both are equally inherent in the

enjoyment of the constructed home,

I think the lien and bond statutes quoted
were an outgrowth of the common law concept respecting personalty as it relates to
realty. This concept contemplated the "af-

[9]

We, therefore, hold that where land-

scaping is clone during the construction of a
1 lome and as an integral part of the construction for the purpose of contributing
toward the enjoyment to be had from living
in that home, the work done and material
furnished would be subject to a mechanic's
lien.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Each party will bear its own costs.

fixation*' of something to the realty, which
something, if uprooted or jerked out, seriously would impair the land itself and possibly the marketability of the fee.
Leveling off sagebrush affixes nothing to
the realty. M ami re adds only a temporary
offensive odor, and many times seeds add
only to the digestion of our feathered
friends,—ail of which need no compendium
here,—where only shrubbery incident to the
erection of a home is concerned, which

18 U T A H s
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home, like the shrubbery, is affixed to the

accomplished during the construction of the

realty, as usually is the case with a furnace

home or later, irrespective of the question

or Dutch oven.

of enjoyment and regardless of distance

I think the common law

analogy of affixation to the realty should

from the home, if it can be demonstrated

be the test.

that an affixation to the realty was con-

The instant case meets that

test, but does not bottom its result on that

templated and accomplished.

ground.

added.)

If Hooten had been confined to

(Emphasis

its own facts, I wouldn't give a hoot, but it
has, besides sagebrush, a few little Virginia
creepers- in its verbage or verbiage that
might obscure the lien law landscape.
The main opinion concludes that "where

XELSOX, District Judge (dissenting).
I cannot agree with the distinction made
by the prevailing opinion of the instant case
with that of Backus v. Hooten. 1

landscaping is done during the construction

Nor do I agree that in the instant case

of a home and as an integral part of the

the so-called landscaping was done as an

construction for the purpose of contributing

integral part of the building of a home.

toward the enjoyment to be had from living in that home," a lien attaches.

Nor can I accept the conclusion that the
installation of a concrete waterfall and pool

I don't think the enjoyment of the home

gave the same esthetic qualities to the

has anything to do with the problem, since

house, which was erected, as would the

there is at least anticipatory enjoyment in

paint applied to the building after it was

spreading fertilizer on a plowed plot plant-

finished.

ed with lawnseed. And I don't think lienability depends on whether the labor and
materials were furnished during the construction of the home.
I think the realistic test is whether they
were furnished for the purpose of affixing
something that would become a part of the
realty in the common law concept, whether

The enjoyment of a building should not
be a determinant in the interpretation and
application of the mechanic lien law.
For the reasons stated, I dissent.

CROCKETT, C. J., having disqualified
himself did not participate herein.

1. Backus v. Hooten. 4 Utah 2d 364, 294 P.2d 703.
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n May 4, 1966, as to the investigation
ndings of the disciplinary proceedings
ht against John Klwood Dennett, said
ussion recommending his disbarment;
hereafter, on May 21, 1966, Mr. D a i ly counsel filed with this Court a IVtior Remand of the matter to the Bar
nission on the basis that Mr, Dennett
lenicd due process for the reason that
an accused had not been given an opnily to be heard by the Commission bethe

lattcr's

recommendation;

that

ug thereon was had before the Court
me 6, 1966; that thereafter, on June 6.
the matter was returned to the Bar
nission with a request that such an opnitty be granted; that thereafter, in re>e to such request, the Bar Commission,
ut one member present, afforded such
rtunity and heard Mr, Dennett and his
sel on June 15, 1966, at Park City, Utah,

S H U P E v. M E N L O V E
Citcns 18 Utah 2d 130
cost plus ten percent. The j i f y in District
of $1,230.22 for defendant's failure t«
perform.
Court, Salt Pake County, Aldon j . Ander-

It is hereby stipulated by counsel for
Mr. Dennett and for the State liar Commission that

following the hearing of

son, J., found that defendant substantially

this matter this day the matter is sub-

performed,

milled for plenary review by the Supreme

percent totaled $ 13,000 and that

Court upon the record before the Court,

was entitled to $1,230.22 damages for defendant's failure to fully perform.

the Board of Bar Commissioners at Park

ant appealed, seeking about $-19,000 or new

City (June

15, 1966)

being

submitted

trial.

original

The Supreme Court, Crockett, j . ,

marized

fore the Court.

detailed exhibits was within discretion of

•an h that

trial

f '''is are ascertainable to resolve issu<

Having heard the arguments,

reviewed

exhibit

court

of costs prepared

and

that

j u r y ' s findings

totaling $13,000 and that attorney's

Association be sustained, and it is ordered

and costs were properly

and adjudged that Mr. John Klwood Dennett

judgment

of cost plus ten

issues are

understandabli

0. Appeal and Error <3^I067
If language of instructions to jn

refused,
such

that issues are

understandable

law in the State of Utah, and that his name

1. Trial e^I39(t)

trial court's failure to give instruction

be, and hereby is, stricken from the roll of

The. jury has exclusive prerogative to
determine credibility of evidence and to
find facts.

quested by defendant will not conslituf

Attorneys of the State of Utah.

(

' .

>. ' I ' l l * S»1HMJ>

The jury is not obligated to accept testimony whenever there is a basis from which

. :' : M 2tf!

bias, prejudice or self-interest may be seen,

R u t h W , SB - J . n . ' H t f f f ami Respondent,

or there is anything incredible in testimony.
Damages €==>I40

Company, Defendant and Appellant.

ing the Petition of July 7, 1966; that
foregoing petitions were argued to the
it by counsel for Mr. Dennett and for
Bar Commission, at the termination of
Suit

for cost plus ten percent, reasonable basis

Supreme Court of lit all.
Aug. 5, VMM*.

existed in evidence to justify jury in re-

whereby

7. Evidence €^350

defendant

agreed to build a house for plaintiff

Summary of evidence, to be admismust be shown to have been developed t
records, books or documents, eoinpctcm
which has been established and records i
be available for examination and wil
must be subject to cross-examination
ccrning such evidence.

U.C.A.1953, 7H

16 and (5).

In a suit on contract to build a house

No. 10405.

in contract

vcrsible error.

2. Evidence <t^50n, 590
Witnesses €=^370

3. Contracts €=^322(5)

sides

Purpose of iustiuclious is suffie
.. .'otnplished if language of iustrueh

facts are ascertainable to resolve i^

v.

both

fees

affirmed.

Roy A. M E N L O V E , cilia Meniove Construction

for

percent

be, and he is, disbarred from the practice of

thereafter on July 22, 1966, Mr. Den-

counsel

from

supported

the matter and the pleadings, it is ordered

, a suspension, rather than disbarment;

h argument

evidence

that the recommendation of the U t a h Bar

a petition objecting to the Bar Coin-

dated in writing as follows:

5. Trial 0^220(3)

day as the arguments of the matter be-

thereafter, on July 7, 1966, Mr. Dennett

filed a Petition for Review, without

Party complaining of refusal to g;
structions must submit accurate reque^
instructions, and they must be neithci
leading nor argumentative.

held that exclusion of evidence of a sum-

recommendation;

ion's action, requesting, for medical rea-

Defend-

4. Appeal and Error €=5210(7)

together with oral arguments made this

(1, returned the matter to this Court, rethe

plaintiff

the arguments which were made before

after considering the arguments preining

that reasonable cost phis ten

for

0. Evidence €^302
Admission in evidence of a sumn

fusing to believe that cost plus ten percent

of

totaled more than $13,000 awarded; and in

discretion of trial court.

finding that plaintiff was entitled to offset

25-16 and (5).

evidence

rests

largely

within

so

U.C.A.1953,
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S H U P E v. MENLOVE
n i o n i 1RUtn»i2(l 1.10

formed;

(2) that his reasonable cost plus

Tn a suit on defendant's contract to

ten per cent totaled $13,000; (3) that his re-

tiff as part of the costs of construction. In
addition to this, Mcniovc added another

There arc several things which

ild a house for cost plus ten percent, cx-

quest for reasonable attorney fees, costs and

ten per cent" for social security, payioil tax-

could regaid as easting some dot

ision of exhibit summarizing evidences

certain other disbursements was

Evidence C=>356

credibility of evidence and to find

without

es and unemployment insurance; and lo Ibis

whether the icroids kept hy the <

costs as shown in several more detailed

merit; and (4) plaintiff was entitled to an

total was added the final ten per cent for

on this job and in its relationship

liihits which were neither so numerous

offset of $1,230.22 damages for defendant's

the contractor's profit.

•r complicated that they could not be com-

failures lo fully perform.

Defendant ap-

were complete and accurate.

For the months of November, December,

It w

that there were some inadequacies

lently appraised by jury and as to which

peals, seeking judgment in the amount he

January

ere were indications of uncertainty was

claims due of about $49,000, or a new trial.

presented to the plaintiff and were paid.

tin's Shtipc residence.

Thereafter no statement was presented until

no such complete segregation in.

June 10, 1963, when a statement covering

shortly before the trial.

•t improper.

U.C.A.1953, 78-25-16 and

The contract referred to was entered into
in November of 1962.

(1)

that the defendant was to construct the

>. Costs €=> 173(1)
In a suit on contract to build a house
•r plaintiff for cost plus ten percent, in
icw of jury finding that cost plus ten pcr•nt totaled $43,000 and not $49,000 as
laimed by defendant and an offset

It provided:

for

laintiff for $1,230.22, rejection of defendnt's request for attorney's fees and costs
as not an abuse of discretion. U.C.A.1953,
S-l-17, 3&-1-18.

George M. McMillan, Franklin D. Johnon, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Brycc E. Roe, Salt Lake City, for repondent.

house in accordance with plans and at the
most reasonable cost available, plus ten
per cent; (2) that bills for labor, materials
and expenses would be submitted to the
plaintiff

monthly, or more frequently

if

necessary; (3) that defendant would carry
any type of insurance necessary
state of

Utah, and

(4)

that

in the

defendant

wquld obtain all bids and information and

and

February

statements

were

certainties as to a breakdown in n
Tn fact, tl
It was

March, April ¥ and May, totaling $19,000

dicated that the defendant's men \

plus dollars was presented to the plaintiff.

mittcd to keep their own time rce

This brought the total to $38,000, and there

were not required to show what t

was several thousand dollars woith of woik

spent on the vat ions phases of eon*

yet to be done, which precipitated contro-

The witnesses called by the defen

versy. The defendant continued to perform

an interest to serve.

work on the premises for some months

ones were the defendant's (Mcnlo\

Two of the

thereafter and eventually this lawsuit was

associated

filed to resolve their differences.

Others were subcontractors who

[1-3]

It is* defendant's

position

that

in

the

construction

been paid and who admitted an in
the outcome of the case.

consult with plaintiff before letting sub-

since the jury found that he substantially

contracts.

N o limit was stated as to the

pcrfoimcd his agreement to construct the

A s wc have heretofore stated: "

overall cost, hut testimony indicated it was

house that it follows as a matter of law that

ever there is a basis fiom which bia

he is entitled to the costs shown by his own

dice or self-interest may be seen,

intended to be about $35,000.
Defendant procured most of the materials
through Apex Lumber Company in which

CROCKETT, Justice.

he owns a substantial interest.

The policy

This suit arises out of a written contract

of Apex was to charge the contractor (Men-

»y which the defendant Roy A. Mcniovc

love) cost plus ten per cent for materials

igrccd to build a house for the plaintiff at

and supplies.

1203 Yale Avenue in Salt Lake City for

to overhead and five per cent was credited

Five per cent was allocated

cost plus ten per cent. Upon a trial by jury

to the owner-purchaser's (Menlovc's) equity

i)f the various issues presented it found:

in the Apex Company. The total of the cost

(1) that defendant had substantially pcr-

,plus ten per cent was charged to the plain-

evidence, phis the ten per cent profit agreed

is anything incredible in the testin

upon, totaling $-19,630.

The fallacy in this

jury is not obligated to accept it."

is the assumption that the jury

the grounds just discussed, and th

contention

was obliged lo believe and accept the de-

as wc view it, there appears to be .'i

fendant's evidence and records as absolute.

able basis in the evidence to justify

It is true that the juiy cannot be petiuitted

in refusing to believe that the cost

to unreasonably and arbitrarily disregard

per cent totaled more than

competent

awarded; and in finding that the

credible evidence.

I5ut it

is

their exclusive prerogative to determine the

the

was entitled to the offset of $1,230

I. Sec Pngc v. Fed. Seruiily JiiMiir. Co., 8 Utah 2d 220, W2 I'.2d (»(Ki.

SCHOW v. GUARDTONE
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( ' l i e m 18 f t j t h 2«I 1,'?H

4 61 (Yttaiu c i n n s a i r a c signed with
pcct to the instinct inns which we do not
•in it necessary to detail hut with respect
reto make these observations: In rcgatd
refusal to give instructions, it is essential
it the complaining pait> has suhmitted
curate icquests, and that they he neither
steading nor argumcntalhe.* T h e purse of the instructions is sufficiently acmplishcd if they present the case to the
ry in language from which they will
iderstand the issues involved and which
fords them an oppoituuity to asccttain the
scntial facts and resolve those issues,
this is done, the meie fact that the trial
mi t failed to give insti tietions i cqucsted
/ the defendant, even though accuiate
ill not constitute icveisihle nioi." 1
[7-91 Krror is also assigned in rejecting
u exhihit prcpatcd and offered in evidence
y the defendant.
It purpotted to sum
laiize the claimed costs as shown in severa
norc detailed exhihits, 5 through 12, Sec
8-25-16 U.C.A.1953 permits the use of ummary of evidence in certain instances,
>ne of which is subsection (5), when "the
>rigina! consists of numerous accounts oi
»thcr documents which cannot he examined
in coutt without great loss of time, and the
evidence sought from them is only the
general icsnll of the whole." However, as
we have heretofore stated: " [ T J h e c\ idence must he shown to he developed, fioci
iccoids, hooks or documents, the coir
2,

I.und v. Mtn. Fuel Supply Co., 12 Utah
2«1 2(IS, r»(>5 I\2«I rr,:*,; P.hminqui^t v.
Iniffolon Mfg. Co., 47 Wnsh.2«t H'2% 2S<)
1\2«1 1011.
3 Sen Wilson v. Onnlner, It) Ftnli 2»1 81),
318 I\2<1 U.U; ICnrle v. Suit Lnk« &

petency of which has been established, and
the iccoids must he available foi examination by the opposing p.ntie^ and the witness
subject to cross examination concerning
such evidence." * '| he rpicstion as to whethci these conditions aii met is for the liial
court to deletmiuc and u s t s hugely within
his sound discretion. Tn regaul to this exhibit Mr. M e n b n c testified:
"I utilized the imoices and the infoimation on this invoice relative to materialand when they were delivered and the
labor as is shown there, and by my ow i
infoimalion or knowledge, what I coub
lemember fiom the job. Also what ty p«
of win k indi\ iduals were doing for u
on the job."
ii of feting the exhibit counsi I stated:

'Section .>S* 1 17.- As b» (ween the owner
,.i,l

it.,*

rniili'irl.if

I hi"

rf*utt

hot lion the costs in mutiny
*//e C(tSC, btft ifl a l '

r

r/,,i//

" 7 f*2«I ill'A

nh~

'
to the lipht of

'lSCS e-.rh

Russell S, s c H O W and Doris Re!
wlfr » Pinlntjffs ,nnl Apfiollar

<mhenii-

Y>

iaeior exhibiting a lieu shall have his
-«sts awaided to him, including the costs

GUARDTONF, INC., a Nevada roi
ei al
n-fpnilaii!s and nrciinm

)( preparing and recording the notice of

No. I051G.

zlaim of lien and such reasonable at torley's fee as may he incut red in piepaiing

,'I|J(I., „„, Court of Ktali
^ >jf

uid iccoiding said notice of claim of lien.
'Section 38-1-18.—In any action biought

Action

o enforce' any lien under this chapter
'he successful

party

shall be entitled

recover a reasonable attorney's
pved

to

%<>id for fraud.

(10]

T h e final claim of e n or we gi\**

attention to is the trial couit's lefusal i-f
defendant's request for attorney fees and
co^ts.

vu\\\

'I In p t i t i m n t statutes a r c :

u . <'<*>i>.f m o Utah i n , i«;r> i \ 2 d

S77.
4. Rco Mpuiuiii* \ !*.«»> h*s t.ti^-. Drilling
C«,., 1 Utah 2.1 .'Ml. 2!U I'.'Jfl (ISO.

system

1 he Fourth Pisti

I'bili County, U. L. Tuckctt, J ,

(Kiiiphasts add-

inn

ul.)

\cidict

they appealed.

It is plain that these two sections relating
" W e would stipulate that if thete are an
items which are contained in this e x h i h r
- which ate not reflected in the evidence
they ma\ be disregai ded."
In addition to these indications of uncetainty, it is further to be observed that exhibits 5 Ihiough 12 aie neither so numerous
nor so cnmplicab d that they could not be
competently examined and appiaiscd by the
imy. 1 he tiial couit was within its prciog
ative in excluding the pioposcd exhibit.

hoincouueis to 1

uiutiicatinii and fife alarm

fee, to be

by the court, which shall be ta.uul

r t osls in this action."

b\

tracts relating tn pui chase of

in

f.»\or

of

plain!

'I he Supreme («

' ^ " " " K " . J-, "eld that j u r y was
in

to this subject should be construed together
and that when attorney fees are awardable

"

n

K"<K»S t 1 , a t a f r a , I ( I h ^ l keen
t ^ » t i f f s f and that j u r y c<

thereunder they aie to be treated as costs
which, as expressed in 3H 1-17 the couit
/'shall appoition the costs according to the

^"^>1y refuse to believe that t\,
-'^signce of contract was mi iiino<
chaser.

liKlit of tlK- case". Vic»viiiR the overall
pictuie of this case in the lii^ht most favorable to the facts as found by the iuiv and
to the verdict and judgment we cannot sa\
that the dial com t abused its discietion in

R ( . v c r s c d .-,,„, rcmnml.-d uil
,
.
ii"iis to enter judgment m arcoida
«. iv verdict.
' J"«»9mcnt O^I9fl(3.im

i ejecting defendant's contentions,
Judgment at finned.
(icspondent).

CosH to plauiU

J I K N R I O I ) . t\ J , and Aid)(>NOU< i l l
.nii.1 C A L L I S T k R , \].t concut.

Trial

judge's

pi erogativc

I

indgiueiit not w itli-Ianding verdict »
« h" n e exercised only in situatio

e

there is no reasonable basis in e\ i
j n s t i f v V enlic«.
2. Contracts €^99(3)

\ V A l ) I r , J., heaid the aiguiueuls but died
before the opinion was filed.

"j"|, 0 first cpiesti(,n in action
contiaets \oided for fiaud is whetb

